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1 Introduction
The following chapter analyzes the recently emerged phenomenon of the use of
force at sea by private actors (private maritime security companies). The utilization
of force in the maritime domain by private actors—a novelty in the modern
common international experience1—proved to be a considerable challenge to
international law and good practice. After initial antagonism, the international
community has gradually accepted the notion of utilizing private maritime security
companies. Following the plight of individual coastal states (most notably, the
United States (US)) and certain parts of the shipping industry, more and more
nongovernmental actors became reliant on the private maritime security services
within a short period of time, forcing the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) to reassess its position with regard to the use of force at sea by private
actors.2 This made it necessary to adjust the international approach as, up to that
point, it was in principle prohibited for private actors to carry arms—the notable
exception (recognized by the relevant international maritime law and law of the sea
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conventions and relevant domestic law maritime codes and acts) allows the Masters
of Vessels and First Officers to make use of personal firearms that have to be kept
under lock and key at all times. The security of people and goods at sea—falling
at the same time within the sphere of individual, national, and also common
interests—thus became reinforced by an unprecedented enforcement methodology.
The present chapter particularly focuses on the issue of lethal force utilized by
privately contracted armed security personnel (Contractors)3 as governed by the
standard security services on board vessel contract form, the GUARDCON—
Contract for the Employment of Security Guards on Vessels (GUARDCON).4
The contractual provisions, such as the example of GUARDCON, are often accom-
panied by the standards of conduct and separate rules on the use of force, developed
either by an individual private maritime security company or by a professional body
or association (usually consisting of private maritime security companies and/or
other interested stakeholders). Several guidelines and recommendations, drafted
particularly for the maritime domain (i.e., the IMO Guidance, the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Guidance, the 100 Series Rules, the
IAMSP Rules on Use of Force, the ISO/PAS 28007:2012, and the ASIS/ANSI
PSC. 4) will be analyzed and compared in order to assess the extent to which, inter
alia, the issue of the use of force is harmonized on a global level. Due to the fact that
none of these documents are mandatory and legally binding, they are necessarily
accompanied and intertwined with domestic regulation or nonbinding recommen-
dations, as well as general domestic criminal and civil laws, especially in connec-
tion to the issue of self-defense. A number of jurisdictions will, therefore, be
analyzed in order to examine the noted interconnection.
2 The Shifting Nature of Maritime Security
The core actors in the maritime-related privatization of violence encompass the full
spectrum of shipping-related stakeholders, including nongovernmental actors
concerned with the issue of human rights at sea—a separate drive that reviews
the phenomenon of the use of force at sea by private actors as a possible insecurity
factor, leading to an increased level of violence and increased insecurity of people
and goods at sea. Thus, the conjunction of individual, national, and common
interests is interrupted by a conflict of interest within its core—in order to achieve
better security, one forgoes principles that have ensured security thus far. This
dilemma is ever so problematic, especially when considering that the primary goals
of any sound ocean security governance are to promote peaceful use of the seas and
oceans (as stipulated by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and other
3Often used abbreviation: PCASP.
4Baltic and International Maritime Council, see: BIMCO (2012a). For a legal analysis of
GUARDCON, see: Mudric´ (2015a, b).
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related international instruments). It, therefore, continues to be true that the privati-
militarization of sea in the name of peace remains a dubious concept, despite the
argument that the utilization of violence by private actors only serves to promote
the noted principle of peace.
The initial conflict of interest has slowed down the bottom-up lawmaking
process. This is especially true for the period when the majority of states have
continued to adhere to the state’s monopoly on violence principle at sea,5 despite
the fact that this principle has long been breached with regard to the activities of
private military and security companies on land, including such companies working
directly for government institutions in and outside of conflict (war) zones. But when
the shipping and insurance driving forces ushered in the private contractors in the
maritime domain, the states, already accustomed to the utilization of private
security industry on land, soon adjusted to the emerging subbranch of the global
private security industry. Initially—keeping in mind that the predominant
maritime-related interest of the international community as a whole continues to
be the security of people and goods at sea—the introduction of firearms held by
private entities into that realm was considered as a violation of the common interest
(leading to the possible spread of and an increase in violence). This perception has,
however, gradually transformed into a compromise solution whereby the security
services are to be offered by professional entities trained and properly equipped to
utilize violent means when no other means are available to thwart the realization of
danger to people and goods at sea in accordance with the best industry practice,
such as the example of the Montreux Document (not relevant for the maritime
sector).6
The role of the state was, therefore, diminished to a certain extent, partially due
to the private contractual nature of private maritime security services (as opposed to
such instances when states contract private actors to do their bidding), even though
states persist in their determination to remain the watchful dog through carefully
drafted legislation. The impact of this effort is, however, dubious due to the
practical difficulties of control and supervision enforcement. At the same time,
the role of the private sector in the protection of seas and oceans continues to
increase—the scope of utilization echoing beyond any precedent.
Nevertheless, the compromise solution does not disentangle the continuous
dilemma as to whether the introduction of private actors’ right to utilize force at
sea equals a step closer to or a step further away from the general security of people
and goods at sea, posing a serious challenge to the law of the sea and ocean security
governance. The latter is especially true when considering the appearance of private
armed flotillas that today offer security services to individual vessels while tomor-
row they may potentially be utilized for a broader (private) purpose, exempt from
5For more information, see: Petrig and Geiβ (2011), Tondini (2012), Williams (2014), Coito
(2013) Berube and Cullen (2012), Andreone et al. (2013), Kraska (2011) and Mejia et al. (2013).
6For more information on the Montreux Document, see: International Committee of the Red Cross
(2009) and Buckland and Burdzy (2013).
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any form of organized, institutional control. In the context of the emerging field of
Maritime Security Studies,7 private armed flotillas may alternatively function under
a hidden organized, institutional control, as one means of hybrid maritime warfare,
somewhat similar to when the Letter of Marque granted certain formal authority to
the private actors of the past.
At the same time, when states ratify international instruments, they are granted
certain rights but are, at the same time, bound to accept certain obligations as well.
The security of people and goods at sea is a general obligation present in various
international conventions, including the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The emergence of maritime crimes and piracy poses such security threats that must
be tackled swiftly and without delay, and the lack of proper domestic tools
necessary to combat such occurrences is a poor excuse for nonperformance. An
analogy with the private salvage industry serves to demonstrate that the need for
such an industry is brought about by the inability of the majority of coastal states to
train, equip, and maintain a domestic salvage capacity, thus being heavily reliant on
the private salvage industry to meet their needs and fulfill their obligations.
It remains to be seen whether the utilization of private actors in the context of
providing maritime security services may potentially become a standard mecha-
nism in case a certain set of conditions is met, thus entangling the private sector into
the regular network mechanism of domestic maritime security. It should be noted
that the sanctioning of private actors’ right to utilize force was just one aspect of the
international response to the scourge of piracy, and it took a while to formulate,
following a careful evaluation. In the context of the recent Mediterranean crisis and
the increased human trafficking by sea, whereas certain stakeholders argue for the
employment of private actors in, among other things, combating organized crime,
state navies—European Union in particular—have long initiated joint efforts to
fight the smugglers. The effort has been reinforced with the relevant United Nations
Security Council’s resolutions, enabling further steps to be undertaken, much
similar to what was witnessed in Somalia several years ago (which has, among
other factors, enabled the overt in-land combat activities as conducted by the Joint
Special Operations Command and other militaries that have by far most contributed
to the elimination of the pirate outposts in the region). During the height of the
piracy threat, similar state navies’ activities were initiated in the Somalian waters
and the Gulf of Aden (still active today), providing safe passage to the vessels
that can afford to wait, and patrolling over the High Risk Area, representing
predominantly moral support to all the endangered seamen. At the same time, the
newly developed piracy tribunals were kept busy in prosecuting captured pirates—
courtesy of the previously mentioned navies—whereas a small number of cases
appearing before the regional coastal states’ courts have tackled the issue of private
maritime security companies offering their services without any proper documen-
tation or licenses. Quite recently, one case has appeared before the International
7For more general information and background, see: Bueger (2015), pp. 159–164, and Kraska and
Pedrozo (2013).
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that deals with the issue of alleged unlawful use of
force at sea (Enrica Lexie).
3 Use of Force, Regulation, and Consequences: General
Overview
On 22 October 2014, the Washington jury found four former Blackwater
(US private military and security company) private security guards guilty of several
charges—murder in the first degree, manslaughter, and attempted manslaughter.
This is the result of a 7-year investigation and proceedings following the all-out
shoot-out at Nisour Square, Baghdad, Iraq, on 16 September 2007.8 The first
instance decision (pending appeal), based on the jury’s verdict, represents a rare
example where the employees of a private military and security company have been
found accountable and responsible for conduct exhibited during the performance of
a contracted security service that has caused bodily harm and death to innocent
bystanders. It also represents a rare occasion where the issue of the use of force by
private actors has been legally scrutinized.
On 15 February 2012, two Italian marines, providing government-authorized
Vessel Protection Detail (VPD)9 service to the Italian tanker Enrica Lexie, alleg-
edly shot and killed two Indian fishermen. The proceedings are still under way.10
The former is an example of (questionably) excessive use of force when pro-
viding private military and security service on land and the latter of (questionably)
excessive use of force when providing (private) maritime security services. Both
examples represent what is often referred to as a “hot potato” or an “elephant in the
room”—an issue very difficult to tackle, assess, and regulate. The law, in general,
allows the use of force (the right of an individual to use force as a defensive
measure), including the lethal kind, only when absolutely necessary and only
when it serves to prevent equal or greater harm. This is generally accepted as
lawful use of force. What amounts to excessive use of force or unlawful use of force
is something difficult to ascertain through clear regulation and very much depends
on the circumstances of each particular case. Any conclusion reached by a tribunal
thus easily falls into the arena of criticism.
Incidents at sea with deadly consequences are being reported at an increasing
rate. Beginning with as early as March 2010,11 unfortunate events involving the
death of innocent fishermen are becoming a harsh reality,12 placing a growing
shadow on the provision of private maritime security services in general.
8See: Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2014.
9For more general information on VPDs, see: Guilfoyle (2013), p. 221 et seq.
10See: The Hindu, December 16, 2014.
11See: Symmons (2012), 36—the “MZ Alinezaan” case.
12See, for example: Katz (2012).
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Simultaneously, a growing number of reports indicate possible excessive behavior
of individual armed security guards.13
With regard to the maritime domain, IMO and the private maritime security
services industry have produced a number of legally nonbinding rules with the
purpose of providing guidance to states, private maritime security service pro-
viders, and clients with regard to, inter alia, the use of (lethal) force.14 An increasing
number of states have also adopted guidelines and/or ordinances with regard to the
provision of private maritime security services. A number of such legal documents
will be examined in this chapter in order to ascertain the extent to which the issue of
the use of force has been regulated and/or considered. Only a small number of
available documents are legally binding in nature—most are offered on a voluntary
basis, with the private maritime security industry, which claims to be a professional
industry, being under increased pressure to willingly incorporate such recommen-
dations into their standard operation procedures. The courts will have a final say,
but the fact that only a fraction of reported incidents concerning the provision of
private security services on land and none in the maritime domain have reached the
courts speaks of the sensitivity and difficulty of the issue at hand.
Several attempts were made in the past to produce an international convention
regulating the activity of private military and security companies in general,15 but
no such project came to life, likely due to the fact that the use of private security
providers, although present throughout the ages (especially in the few recent
decades),16 contradicts the fundamental monopoly of the state over the use of
force and, as such, creates ambiguous feelings towards a formal recognition of
their indispensable status in the modern world. However, one should not neglect the
fact that, very often, states directly contract private military and security compa-
nies’ services, thus effectively authorizing such companies to utilize violent mea-
sures (derived from the state’s monopoly on violence) when necessary and
appropriate. In other words, depending on the nature of a particular operation, an
activity performed by the engaged private actor may constitute an activity so
inherent to the notion of state sovereignty and state performance that any formal
line of differentiation—of where the state’s functions end and private actor’s
separate operations begin—is easily blurred in practice. Any proper international
instrument that would regulate the conduct of private security companies would
have to take that into consideration and provide for an equal level of measures in
case of a breach of an obligation, against both the private actors and government
institutions that employed them, and possibly other relevant states (in line with the
Montreux principles). This is perhaps another reason for ambiguity with regard to
the existence of such an instrument, which requires further consideration.
13See: Dutton (2013), p. 111 et seq.—the “Avocet” case.
14See generally: Mudric´ (2011), p. 165.
15For more general information, with the focus on maritime domain, see: Dutton (2013), p. 140.
Especially see: Scheimer (2009).
16For more information, see: Mikac (2013), Chapter II.
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3.1 Prelude to Precedent
In the much-discussed and still ongoing case Enrica Lexie, the use of force utilized
by a six-strong Italian military protection team led to the undesired consequence of
two Indian fishermen being shot dead.
Although most of the facts are continuously being disputed by the involved
parties,17 awaiting the final court determination, the early sources indicated that
(a) the incident occurred during the day; (b) the fishing trawler had at one point
allegedly maneuvered toward the tanker (in accordance with some accounts, this
consisted of a sharp move towards the tanker, in order to pass by the stern—difficult
to be confirmed due to the fact that seven out of nine fishermen present on the
trawler were asleep at the time of the incident, and the two in charge of navigation
were killed); (c) the vessel made no attempt to avoid the approach; (d) the Team
Leader failed to consult the Master of Vessel or any of the crew with regard to the
steps to be taken (in accordance with the Master’s and First Officer’s testimony18);
(e) warning shots fired (the Italian marines claim that they utilized warning light
signals prior to the shooting—an action with a dubious effect during the day)
resulted in lethal consequences, thus failing to fulfill their purpose; (f) the fishermen
were not armed, nor did they exhibit any hostile intentions (the inspection of the
tanker failed to produce any evidence of the tanker being fired upon, which was
argued by the Italian marines); (g) the tanker failed to immediately report the
incident to the proper authorities and proceeded with its voyage; and (h) the
Indian Coastal Police alerted the Indian Coastal Guard, who contacted the tanker,
which only then altered its course and steered back to the port of Kochi.19
The questions pending before the Indian Supreme Court20 are whether the Italian
marines acted in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (it is relevant to note
that the service provided by the Italian marines is derived from the state’s monopoly
over the use of force21) and whether their actions entail criminal and/or civil
responsibility and liability. The decision to be reached by the Indian court will
make a significant impact on the provision of private maritime security services and
the issue of rules on the use of force as it will provide a much-awaited court
determination with regard to the use of force in general and the use of lethal
force in particular.
17For more information on the Indian position and the decisions reached by the Kerala High Court,
see: Gandhi (2013), pp. 3–5. See, however, the formal position of the parties as submitted to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea portal, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India),
Case No. 24, available at: https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-24/.
18See, for example: Reuters, 10 June 2013.
19See: Eboli and Pierini (2012), p. 4.
20Subject to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Order 24 of August 2015, whereby
both parties are ordered to suspend all court proceedings which might produce a negative effect
with regard to the dispute submitted to the arbitral tribunal, see: International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (2015).
21For more information, see: Petrig (2013), pp. 669–670.
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3.2 Use of Force
3.2.1 Right to Self-Defense
In accordance with the generally established principle of self-defense, a person
causing damage (actor) has a legally valid defense when utilizing reasonable
measures to protect himself or a third person, provided that the injured party has
endangered the protected interests.22 The actor must demonstrate the necessity of
the defensive measures and ensure that the defensive measures are proportionate to
the perceived threat.23 If that is the case, it will be deemed that any damage so
caused is a legally relevant damage and that it is for the sole accountability and
responsibility of the other (injured) person endangering the protected interests to
suffer the consequences (liability) of the legally relevant damage.24
In the context of the current examination, a good example is the incident that
occurred on 15 October 2014 in the Gulf of Aden, where a motor yacht reported an
approach by a skiff with four people on board, up to a distance of 500 meters,
followed by warning shots fired by the Contractors after the weapons and ladders
were sighted.25 The skiff followed for a while but decided not to pursue. In another
good example that occurred in the Gulf of Aden, three pirate skiffs made two
attempts to approach the vessel.26 The first approach was deterred through the use
of nonviolent evasion measures, whereas during the second approach it was nec-
essary to utilize indirect force (first, a so-called parachute flare—on three separate
occasions, followed by the second measure in the form of indirect warning shots) in
order to persuade the skiffs to move away. Such examples represent a model
scenario on how force is to be used, under what circumstances, and up to what
extent of severity.
The actor may, however, be held liable (for damage) if the defensive measures
are unreasonably excessive or disproportional to the actual threat (excessive self-
defense) or if there was no actual threat (putative self-defense), as examined in
further text.
22Compare: von Bar and Clive (2010), VI. – 5:202, 3665.
23Compare: The M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea),
International Tribunal for the Law of Sea, ITLOS Rep. 10, § 155. For more information on the
case, see: International Tribunal for the Law of Sea portal, available at: https://www.itlos.org/
cases/list-of-cases/case-no-2/case-no-2-merits/.
24Von Bar and Clive (2010), VI. – 5:202: Self-defense, benevolent intervention, and necessity.
25Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).
26Aburgus Risk Management, October 2014c.
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3.2.2 Relevant Maritime-Related National Legislation and Guidelines
A growing number of jurisdictions have enacted laws, ordinances, and recommen-
dations with respect to the provision of private maritime security services. Such
legal documents usually contain several important considerations with regard to the
right to use force and the limitations of such use.
The US Port Security Advisory (3-09) Guidance on Self-Defense or Defense of
Others by U.S. Flagged Commercial Vessels Operating in High Risk Waters (PSA),
by definition, includes the use of deadly force within the scope of the right to self-
defense (Rule 2(a)),27 whereby the Master of Vessels retains final authority with
respect to the decision to utilize force (Rule 3(a)).28 The PSA defines imminent
danger as a situation when “. . . an attacker manifests apparent intent to cause great
bodily harm or death. . .” to others, provided that the attacker possesses adequate
means (i.e., weapons, climbing gear, etc.) and acts when the opportunity so
permits.29
The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the
Use of Armed Guards to Defend against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional
Circumstances,30 recognizing the Master’s overall authority (Rule 5.1), sets a
number of rules to be adhered to when considering the use of deadly force. The
use of force must be proportionate and reasonable (Rules 5.6, 8.9, and 8.10), kept to
the minimum necessary level, and can only be leveled up at a gradual basis (Rule
8.3). The Interim Guidance allows for preemptive strikes provided that an attack is
imminent (Rule 8.12), keeping in mind that a mere sighting of a possible threat is
not to be considered as an imminent danger (Rule 8.13).
A similar provision is available in the Croatian Ordinance on the requirements
for legal persons providing the services of boarding armed escort on Croatian-
flagged vessels,31 whereby the Team Leader must sign a statement recognizing the
Master’s final authority over the use of firearms that are to be utilized at a minimum
possible capacity sufficient to thwart an attack (Article 9(2)), subject to the general
Croatian criminal law provisions.
27U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Port Security Advisory
(3-09), Guidance on Self-Defense or Defense of Others by U.S. Flagged Commercial Vessels
Operating in High Risk Waters. For a critical assessment of Port Security Advisory, see: Patrick
(2014), pp. 350–355.
28PSA 3(a)., subject to: Title 33—Navigation and Navigable Waters, Chapter 6—General Duties
of Ship Officers and Owners after Collision or other Accidents, 33 U.S.C. § 383—Resistance of
pirates by merchant vessels.
29PSA, ibid.
30UK Department for Transport, Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed
Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances, Version 1.2,
Updated May 2013.
31Pravilnik o uvjetima koje moraju ispunjavati pravne osobe koje pružaju usluge ukrcaja osoba za
naoružanu pratnju na brodove hrvatske državne pripadnosti, Narodne novine (Official Gazette),
broj (No.) 123/12.
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The requirement of adherence to the general criminal law provisions on self-
defense is restated throughout the Italian Regulation on the employment of con-
tractors on board Italian-flagged ships sailing in international waters under piracy
risk,32 whereby lawful and proportionate use of force is limited to self-defense.
The Indian Guidelines on Deployment of Armed Security Guards on Merchant
Ships33 refer to the necessity of taking all reasonable steps in order to avoid the use
of force that may only be utilized if necessary and in a proportionate manner (Rule
6.9(2)), and only provided that there is an imminent danger (Rule 6.9(3)).34
The Norwegian Provisional Guidelines—Use of Armed Guards on Board Nor-
wegian Ships35 allow the use of force only when the threat is “direct, immediate,
significant and otherwise unavoidable” and only to the extent that the utilization of
force is “necessary, justifiable and proportionate” (Rule 10(2)). Irrespective of the
fact that the Master of Vessel retains final authority, the responsibility for the
decision to use force resides on the individual making such decision (Rule 10(7)).
The Norwegian Guidelines mention a very specific determination of a distance of
2000 meters as viable to assess an actual threat (Rule 10(3)). Another relevant
Norwegian-originated set of guidelines is available under the auspices of the
Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual War Risks Insurance Association—The Guidance
on the Selection of Private Security Companies.36 The Guidance stipulates that
when a threat has been reasonably identified and classified as a hostile intent or a
hostile act (Team Leader and Master of Vessel deciding in conjunction), the Team
Leader is to assume tactical command, with the possibility of using firearms as a
last resort, leading towards, with a gradual progression, the use of deadly force as an
ultimate resort (Rule 2).
3.2.3 Excessive Self-Defense and Putative Self-Defense
Determination of excessive self-defense is applicable for such occurrences where
the measures used to thwart the attack are excessive when compared with the level
of danger threatened.37 Putative self-defense denotes a situation when a measure of
self-defense is utilized under the impression that there is an attack whereas, in
reality, no attack is taking place.38
The Nisour Square incident provides a perspective for consideration. In response
to the call from the Blackwater protection detail providing personal escort and
32Regulation on the employment of contractors on board Italian flagged ships sailing in interna-
tional waters under piracy risk, 29th March 2013, Italian Official Gazette.
33Indian Ministry of Shipping (2011).
34See: Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab & another, Criminal Appeal No. 1057 of 2002.
35Norwegian Mar. Directorate (2011).
36Den Norske Krigsforsikring for Skib—Gjensidig Forening, 2011.
37Von Bar and Clive (2010), VI. – 5:202, 3667.
38Id.
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protection to the USAID director—who was under attack—and upon request from
the US State Department’s regional security officer,39 the second Blackwater team
left the Green Zone in an attempt to provide support and security on the route to be
taken by the first team in order to reach the safety of Green Zone. The second detail
reasoned that Nisour Square would make a good place for staging an ambush to the
advancing first team. What follows has been heavily disputed in the proceedings
and media coverage.40
At one point, a Kia motor vehicle had entered the Nisour Square’s motorcade
circle. The Blackwater team, as alleged by the defendants,41 made several attempts
to signal the vehicle to stop in its tracks. As the vehicle was unresponsive and
continued moving towards the armored column, and due to the fact that the
Blackwater team, as well as any other security force in the theater of operations,
was aware of the danger that such a vehicle could easily represent, the Blackwater
team and the local police officers decided to stop the car, first by hand gestures and
vocal commands and, after the vehicle remained unresponsive, by the use of force.
The force was direct and mortal. What followed was complete chaos, resulting in
many dead and wounded.42
The Blackwater company was operating at the time in accordance with its own
rules of engagement but was additionally bound, by the virtue of Worldwide
Personal Protective Service contract,43 by the US Embassy’s Escalation of Force
policy44 that requires a gradual and proportional use of force, taking into consid-
eration that deadly force may have to be utilized immediately, depending on the
circumstances. The Contractors further claimed that soon after the vehicle was
repeatedly shot at, they came under enemy fire, and that they continued to act in
self-defense.45 One could easily imagine that, being in the theater of operations
such as the Baghdad, a better safe than sorry policy is a policy often utilized by all
engaged forces, armed or otherwise. In this sense, excessive or putative self-defense
is just one step away from becoming a victim, making it extremely difficult to tell
the difference, let alone devise a set of rules defining any points of differentiation in
advance.
It has often been reported that, especially in the High Risk Areas, fishermen
sometimes carry weapons to protect themselves from potential pirate attacks.46 A
mere sighting of weapons on board may not constitute a sufficient reason for
immediate use of lethal force, unless the Contractors have a strong reason to believe
39As noted by Erik Prince, see: Prince (2013), Chapter 13.
40See: United States v. Slough, Criminal No. 2008-0360 (D.C. 2014), District Court, District of
Columbia, Filed: May 23rd, 2014.
41See: Prince (2013), Chapter 13.
42See: Tarzwell (2009), pp. 181–183.
43For more information, see: Cheadle (2009), p. 689 et seq.
44See: U.S. Department of State (2006). Also see: U.S. Department of State (2009).
45See: Prince (2013), Chapter 13.
46See: Symmons (2012), p. 29. Also see: Murdoch (2011), p. 40.
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that the threat is imminent or present. At the same time, practical experience has
shown that assailants are capable of concealing weapons and striking when unex-
pected, placing security guards or armed forces in a difficult position of telling the
difference between an approaching vessel with a hidden agenda (simply acting as a
fisherman) and an innocent passer-by (an actual fisherman).47 In addition, should
they opt for the use of force, the question remains as to which rules they are to base
their decision on whether the use of force is in order.48
3.2.4 Assessment of Reasonable Conduct
In order to understand how the utilization of self-defense in the maritime domain is
determined and understood by the courts, it is necessary to point to several
comparative examples of self-defense regulation applicable to all self-defense
manifestations, including ones in the maritime domain. Various domestic law
regulations and case law, both with regard to criminal and civil laws, in principle,
presuppose similar elements and standards necessary for establishing the right to
claim the self-defense exemption from or exclusion of liability. However, several
important differences in the evaluation of excessive and putative self-defense
conduct are to be noted.
French law and Belgian law require an objective assessment based on the
conduct of a reasonable person or a reasonable professional under the same or
similar circumstances.49 English and Welsh case law recognizes the principle of
proportionality in comparing the act of self-defense with the act of attack but at the
same time acknowledges the extreme circumstances where the balance of propor-
tionality may be difficult to assess by the actor, stipulating the doctrine of reason-
able vs. unreasonable mistakes.50 In accordance with Spanish law, in order to claim
the self-defense exception, the actor must prove the existence of an unlawful and
unprovoked attack where necessary and proportionate force was utilized in order to
thwart that attack.51 Italian law follows the same principles but stipulates that in
case of putative self-defense, it is likely that the principle of contributory negli-
gence will be employed.52 Portuguese law further stipulates that in case of exces-
sive self-defense applied out of fear, the actions will have been justified,53 leaving
47A good example being the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. For more information, see: Mikac
(2013), p. 119.
48For more practical examples and general consideration, see: Neri (2012), p. 83.
49Compare: von Bar and Clive (2010), VI. – 5:202, 3669.
50Compare: Murphy andWitting (2012), pp. 334–335. Also see: Cross v. Kirkby (2000) Times, 5th
April (CA)—where it was deemed relevant what was the defendant’s genuine apprehension of the
circumstances, and whether the critical moment increased the defendant’s anguish. Also see:
Palmer v. R [1971] AC 814.
51Compare: von Bar and Clive (2010), VI. – 5:202, at 3669–3670.
52Compare: ibid., at 3670.
53Compare: ibid., at 3672.
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no possibility for the actor’s liability. Contrary to all the above, Bulgarian law does
not provide any grounds for exclusion from civil liability, even if excessive self-
defense was applied due to fear or fright.54 German law, inter alia, requires the
attack to be unlawful and imminent,55 with an additional rule stipulating that a
professional person must be reasonably prepared for such circumstances and ready
to use proportional force,56 whereas Dutch law, inter alia, requires the attack to be
present.57
3.3 Standards, Guidelines, and Recommendations
Parallel to IMO’s publication of guidelines with regard to the provision of private
maritime security services, a number of interested stakeholders, particularly on the
side of shipping and related industries, have endeavored to issue similar guidance
and recommendations, either to enhance the security of people and goods in relation
to the provision of security services or to increase the popularity of such services.
The emerging soft law, forged in the dwellings of corporate interests, soon began to
develop into hard law—the so-called bottom-up law-making—with an increasing
number of coastal and shipping states enacting laws and ordinances with regard to
the provision of private maritime security services on board vessels flying their
flags.
3.3.1 IMO Interim Guidance
In 2012, IMO issued the Interim Guidance to private maritime security companies
providing contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the High Risk
Area.58 With regard to the use of force, recognizing the Master’s overall authority
(Clause 5.6(1)), the Guidance stipulates (Clause 5.15(2)) that it is necessary to
undertake all reasonable steps in order to avoid the use of force, but should the use
of force be deemed necessary, it should be conducted in a gradual manner, applying
only such measures that are necessary and reasonable in the given circumstances
(Clause 5.15(3)).59
54Compare: ibid., at 3671.
55Compare: ibid., at 3671.
56Compare: ibid., at 3668.
57Compare: ibid., at 3673.
58IMO (2012a).
59The noted recommendations are, in essence, repeated in the: IMO (2012b).
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3.3.2 BIMCO Guidance and GUARDCON
The BIMCO issued the Guidance on Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) by Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant Vessel
(MV) (BIMCO Guidance).60 The BIMCO Guidance should be read in conjunction
with GUARDCON provisions relevant for the relationship between the Master of
Vessel and Team Leader (Clause 5 BIMCO Guidance).
In accordance with Clause 8(b) GUARDCON, when under an “actual, perceived
or threatened act of piracy,” the Contractors’ Team Leader has the right to invoke
the Rules for the Use of Force, and the responsibility for and potential liability
arising out of the discharge of weapons resides with the Contractors. Whereas, in
accordance with Clause 8(d) GUARDCON, the Master of Vessel can order a cease-
fire, each Contractor retains the right of self-defense (the use of lethal force
included). This right is based on the Contractors’ main duty (Clause 3
(b) GUARDCON) to provide protection and defense of the vessel (“using all
reasonable skill and care”—Clause 6(a)), in accordance to which the Contractors
do not guarantee the safety of Vessel (Clause 9) but, instead, promise to act to the
best of their abilities.
In accordance with Clause 3(d), Clause 4(c) and Clause 4(d) BIMCO Guidance,
the use of (lethal) force should be utilized only when essential and strictly neces-
sary, ensuring that the measures undertaken are proportional and appropriate to the
circumstances, and utilized at a minimum necessary level. Clause 4(f) BIMCO
Guidance stipulates that all reasonable steps should be taken to avoid the use of
lethal force. Furthermore, Clause 7 BIMCO Guidance defines the scope of gradu-
ated and proportional defense, requiring (Clause 7(a)(iii)) the use of nonviolent
means first (except when circumstances necessitate immediate use of force)—such
as the show of weapons—followed by (Clause 7(f)) a discharge of weapons in a
graduated flow (warning shots, disabling fire, and, finally, deliberate direct fire).
Clause 7(g) BIMCO Guidance requires certain exemplary conditions to be met
before being allowed to use lethal force, such as the fact that the attack is ongoing
despite the show of weapons and warning shots, with a clear and visible intention on
behalf of the attacker to board the vessel, at the same time demonstrating the use of
weapons.
3.3.3 The 100 Series Rules™
Another legally nonbinding set of rules with regard to the use of force, enjoying
support from many relevant stakeholders, is the 100 Series Rules: An International
Model Set of Maritime Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) (100 Series Rules).61 The
60BIMCO (2012b).
61Globus Intelligence Ltd (2013).
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100 Series Rules follows (Rule 100) the GUARDCON stipulation with regard to the
relationship between the Master of Vessel and Team Leader.
The 100 Series Rules stipulate (Clause 17) that force should be used when
necessary and/or reasonably required as a deterrent when an imminent threat to
life is present and commensurate to the threat posed. Rule 101 stipulates the use of
nonviolent means when there is a reasonable belief that a potential attack is due.
Rule 102 stipulates the use of, inter alia, warning shots to thwart the attack. Finally,
Rule 103 stipulates the right to use lethal force in case of an imminent attack, which
is defined as a manifest, instant, and overwhelming occurrence.
The GUARDCON, BIMCO Guidance, and 100 Series Rules are interlinked with
the ISO/PAS 28007:2012 Ships and marine technology—Guidelines for Private
Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed secu-
rity personnel (PCASP) on board ships (and pro forma contract)62 (ISO/PAS
28007:2012) due to the fact that the organizations publishing or supporting the
noted documents constitute the same or similar stakeholders, and often relate to
each other. In addition, the “pro forma contract” mentioned in the title of ISO/PAS
28007:2012—the quality standard with regard to the conduct of private maritime
security companies—refers directly to the GUARDCON.
3.3.4 IAMSP-2011-01-UOF-001 v2.0
The International Association of Maritime Security Professionals (IAMSP) has
issued the Use of Force, IAMSP-2011-01-UOF-001 v2.0 (IAMSP Rules).63 The
IAMSP Rules are aligned with the Quality Assurance and Security Management for
Private Security Companies Operating at Sea—Guidance ANSI/ASIS PSC. 4 –
2013,64 the quality standard that sets similar but more detailed provisions with
regard to the conduct of private maritime security companies, when compared to
the ISO/PAS 28007:2012.65
The IAMSP Rules place an emphasis on risk assessment (Appendix E IAMSP
Rules), stipulating (Clause 63 IAMSP Rules) that the choice of use of force depends
on the feasibility study. Clause 64 IAMSP Rules further stipulates that the use of
force depends on the nature of attack, the potential for escalation, the attacker’s
intention, and other possibilities (such as the evasion of attack by other means).
Clause 66 IAMSP Rules enhances the previous stipulation by requiring the Con-
tractors to ensure due care and undertake all reasonable steps prior to the utilization
of lethal force. Clause 68 IAMSP Rules stipulates that the final choice of whether to
use lethal force is subject to the reasonability test, in accordance to which the
escalation of force must equal the perceived threat in order for the use of lethal force
62International Organization for Standardization (2012).
63International Association of Maritime Security Professionals (2011).
64American National Standards Institute, Inc. ASIS International (2013).
65For more information on, see: Mudric´ (2015b), pp. 61–62.
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to be allowed. The responsibility arising out of the use of lethal force (Clause
93 IAMSP Rules) resides on the person who, in accordance with the ship’s log,
authorized the use of lethal force. The IAMSP Rules provide a detailed reference
with regard to the chain events leading to the use of lethal force (Appendix B
IAMSP Rules). In order to establish the right to use lethal force, the Contractors
must demonstrate, if possible, the following elements/steps: (a) suspicious vessel,
(b) sighting of weapons and boarding equipment, (c) potential use of nonviolent
means,66 (d) warning shots, and (e) direct fire. With regard to the escalation of
force, the IAMSP Rules detail (Appendix C IAMSP Rules) that in case the attacker
has fired upon the vessel or directed weapons upon the vessel, and provided that the
vessel cannot evade the attack, the minimum use of (lethal) force is allowed in order
to stop the attack, with an additional clarification that the use of (lethal) force is
allowed to escalate in case of a continued attack, until the attack is broken off.
3.4 Open Issues
3.4.1 Present and Imminent Attack
Clause 6(a)(iii) GUARDCON refers to “monitoring suspicious vessels or craft
during the Transit” as one of the main Contractors’ duties. It is, however, unclear
to what extent a suspicious vessel constitutes a threat that would justify a series of
measures to be undertaken, including possible use of force. Under what circum-
stances are the Contractors expected to conclude that a suspicious vessel represents
a clear possibility of an imminent attack, and under what circumstances is such a
vessel to be considered to constitute a clear possibility of a present attack? In
addition, does an approach of a suspicious vessel constitute the necessary elements
required for legitimate use of lethal force?
In a recently reported case occurring in the Straits of Hormuz, after a sighting of
a high-speed skiff approaching the tanker, the Master of Vessel decided to take a
series of evasive measures as preemptive action. When the skiff approached the
tanker, the crew sighted three armed persons equipped with boarding hooks and
ropes. The tanker continued with the nonlethal evasive measures and successfully
thwarted the attack.67 This is a good example of how nonlethal and nonforceful
measures can successfully be utilized to thwart a clearly imminent attack. Thus, and
as many previously examined guidelines suggest, the (lethal) force should only be
used when the attack is imminent and when no other means are available to prevent
the occurrence of the attack. From the few available undisputed facts in connection
to the Enrica Lexie case, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Team Leader made
66A detailed description of the available means, with or without the presence of non-armed or
armed guards on the vessels, is available in: Industry Stakeholders (2011). The document was
endorsed by the IMO, and published as: IMO (2011).
67Aburgus Risk Management, October 2014c.
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any sort of suggestions to the Master of Vessel with regard the use of other means
prior to resorting to deadly force.
3.4.2 Reasonability and Proportionality vs. Extreme Circumstances
A pirate skiff may follow the vessel and scout the premises. Is the use of lethal force
necessary in order to protect the vessel under such circumstances? In addition, what
constitutes a reasonable measure as opposed to unreasonable measures? Is the rule
of proportionality a guiding principle to be used for all circumstances, or can the
existence of extreme circumstances (such as the occasion of exchange of fire,
including heavy weaponry) negate the rule of proportionality and exempt the
actor from liability?
In accordance with the report of the International Chamber of Commerce’s
(ICC’s) International Maritime Bureau with regard to the attack on the bulk carrier
Golden Ice, which occurred on 9 December 2013,68 following an armed attack of a
pirate skiff,69 the Master of Vessel undertook a series of actions in accordance with
the Best Management Practices (BMP, consisting of the following activities: alarm,
fire hoses activated, evasive maneuvers, and, finally, the crew’s retreat to the
protection of citadel).70 Irrespective of the fact that the armed security guards had
made their presence visible,71 the pirates continued with the aggression. Following
a warning flare (general discharge of weapons) and a warning shot (discharge of
weapons in the vicinity of the pirate skiff),72 the pirates nevertheless pursued the
attack and reengaged the vessel with weapons’ fire. Finally, the armed security
guards engaged the pirates directly, resulting in the pirate’s withdrawal. Similarly,
in a recent incident that occurred in the Gulf of Oman, two skiffs approached a
vessel at full speed, with visible ladders on board the skiffs. The pirates opened fire
on the vessel, and the Contractors responded, resulting in the withdrawal of
attackers.73 Such examples indicate circumstances under which the Contractors
are ready (and able) to determine that the use of (lethal) force is the only available
means to thwart the attack.
A pirate skiff may attempt to board the vessel by the use of boarding ladders,
supported by the use of guns. Is the use of lethal force unavoidable under such
circumstances? Is a professional maritime security service provider expected to use
proportional measures to thwart the attack without resorting to ultimate deadly force?
68ICC International Maritime Bureau (2013), p. 25.
69Weapons were sighted. For an example where boarding ladders where sighted, sufficing as a
proof of hostile intentions, see the report on an attack on a chemical tanker, available in: ICC
International Maritime Bureau (2014), p. 28.
70Industry Stakeholders (2011).
71For examples where this proved to be a sufficient deterrence, see: ICC International Maritime
Bureau (2014)—the “Gulf Pearl” case.
72For examples where the warning shots have proved to be sufficient, see: ICC International
Maritime Bureau (2014)—the “MSC Jasmine” case, “Alba Star” case and “Island Splendor” case.
73Aburgus Risk Management (2014b), Issue 29.
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In July 2014 in Nigeria, a group of armed pirates attacked an oil rig platform, and
a firefight ensued between the attackers and policemen guarding the rig, resulting in
the death of five attackers.74 In the attack on the tanker SP Brussels, several people
(both pirates and crew) lost their lives, following a firefight between armed guards
and pirates and the subsequent withdrawal of armed guards and most of the crew to
the safety of the citadel.75 These cases, as is unfortunately very often the case in
some pirate-infested regions such as the West Africa theater of operations, indicate
that sometimes the use of force will likely represent the first and, simultaneously,
the last means of ensuring security on board a vessel. A stringent rule, stipulating
the necessity of following each and every step in accordance with the gradual
increase of force severity, may very well hinder or disable the Contractor’s ability
to provide a successful protection service.
3.4.3 Conclusion
It is unlikely that any new set of recommendations and guidelines will offer a
critically different approach toward the use of force by private entities engaged in
providing private (maritime) security services. A written rule can only provide so
much—the rest is left to the professional service providers, consumers, third party
interests, and, finally, tribunals. The Nisour Square incident adjudication and the
upcoming decision by the Indian Supreme Court (or arbitration decision) in the
Enrica Lexie case have and certainly will shed more light on the overall account-
ability and liability of private military and (maritime) security companies. They
have and will provide legal precedents and bases for possible further adjudication
and will produce a significant impact on the industry. It is, nevertheless, quite likely
that a number of such cases will remain at an all-time low due to the fact that the
facts and circumstances surrounding occurrences when the force is utilized by
private security providers, devoid of objective, neutral, and third-party oversight
and control authority, very often remain blurred and one-sided, making it almost
impossible to claim otherwise.
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